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Extended paretian rules and relative utilitarianism

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1995-07
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This paper introduces the 'Extended Pareto' axiom on Social welfare functions and gives a characterization of the axiom when it is assumed that the Social Welfare Functions that satisfy it in a framework of preferences over lotteries also satisfy the restrictions (on the domain and range of preferences) implied by the von-Neumann-Morgenstern axioms. With the addition of two other axioms: Anonymity and Weak IIA* it is shown that there is a unique Social Welfare Function called Relative Utilitarianism that consists of normalizing individual utilities between zero and one and then adding them.
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Group Preferences, Multi-profile
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