Rational Sabotage in Cooperative Production with Heterogeneous Agents

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dc.contributor.author Corchón, Luis C.
dc.contributor.author Beviá, Carmen
dc.date.accessioned 2009-03-16T10:51:58Z
dc.date.available 2009-03-16T10:51:58Z
dc.date.issued 2006
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation The B.E. Journals in Theoretical Economics: Topics. 2006, vol. 6, nº 1, art. 16
dc.identifier.issn 1935-1704
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3817
dc.description.abstract We present a model of cooperative production in which rational agents might carry out sabotage activities that decrease output. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium without sabotage. It is shown that the absence of sabotage in equilibrium depends on the interplay between technology, relative productivity of agents and the degree of meritocracy. In particular we show that, ceteris paribus, meritocratic systems give more incentives to sabotage than egalitarian systems.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Berkeley Electronic Press
dc.subject.other coorperative production
dc.subject.other sharing rules
dc.subject.other sabotage
dc.title Rational Sabotage in Cooperative Production with Heterogeneous Agents
dc.type article
dc.type.review PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1240&context=bejte
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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