On the competitive effects of divisionalization

e-Archivo Repository

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author Corchón, Luis C.
dc.contributor.author González-Maestre, M.
dc.date.accessioned 2009-03-13T09:44:17Z
dc.date.available 2009-03-13T09:44:17Z
dc.date.issued 2000-01
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Mathematical Social Sciences. (Enero 2000), vol. 39, nº 1, p. 71-80
dc.identifier.issn 0165-4896
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3813
dc.description.abstract In this paper, we assume that firms can create independent divisions which compete in quantities in a homogeneous good market. Assuming identical firms and constant returns to scale, we prove that the strategic interaction of firms yields Perfect Competition if the number of firms is beyond some critical level. Assuming a fixed cost per firm and an upper bound on the maximum number of divisions, we show that when this upper bound tends to infinity and the fixed cost tends to zero, market equilibrium may yield either Perfect Competition or a Natural Oligopoly.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Elsevier
dc.rights & 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
dc.subject.other Divisionalization
dc.subject.other Oligopoly
dc.title On the competitive effects of divisionalization
dc.type article
dc.type.review PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00047-X
dc.subject.jel L13
dc.subject.jel L20
dc.subject.jel L40
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00047-X
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
 Find Full text

Files in this item

*Click on file's image for preview. (Embargoed files's preview is not supported)

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record