On the stability of best reply and gradient systems with application to imperfectly competitive models

e-Archivo Repository

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author Corchón, Luis C.
dc.contributor.author Mas-Colell, A.
dc.date.accessioned 2009-03-13T09:24:27Z
dc.date.available 2009-03-13T09:24:27Z
dc.date.issued 1996
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Economics Letters. 1996, vol. 51, p. 59-65
dc.identifier.issn 0165-1765
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3812
dc.description.abstract We present a general result on the convergence to an equilibrium of class of dynamic adjustment procedures which includes gradient systems and best reply dynamics as special cases - when there are two players and strategy sets are one dimensional. We also show that there are no restrictions on the form of the gradient or best reply dynamics, even under strong restrictions on the functional form of both demand and costs. This implies that we can construct examples with three players where the above dynamical procedures yield chaotic behavior.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Elsevier
dc.rights © 1996 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved
dc.subject.other Gradient
dc.subject.other Best reply
dc.subject.other Chaos
dc.subject.other Stability
dc.title On the stability of best reply and gradient systems with application to imperfectly competitive models
dc.type article
dc.type.review PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(95)00752-0
dc.subject.jel C73
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1016/0165-1765(95)00752-0
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
 Find Full text

Files in this item

*Click on file's image for preview. (Embargoed files's preview is not supported)


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record