Individual rationality and voting in cooperative production

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dc.contributor.author Corchón, Luis C.
dc.contributor.author Puy, M. Socorro
dc.date.accessioned 2009-03-12T11:50:38Z
dc.date.available 2009-03-12T11:50:38Z
dc.date.issued 1998
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Economics Letters. 1998, vol. 59, nº 1, p. 83-90
dc.identifier.issn 0165-1765
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3811
dc.description.abstract Suppose that a group of individuals owns collectively a technology which produces a consumption good from an input. A sharing rule associates input contributions with a vector of consumption. We consider sharing rules that are a convex combination of the Proportional, the Equal Share and the Equal Benefit Rules. We characterize the subset of sharing rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency and individual rationality.We also study the outcome of majority voting on this subselection of sharing rules.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Elsevier
dc.rights & 1998 Elsevier Science S.A.
dc.subject.other Sharing rule
dc.subject.other Individual rationality
dc.subject.other Voting
dc.title Individual rationality and voting in cooperative production
dc.type article
dc.type.review PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00027-5
dc.subject.jel D50
dc.subject.jel D51
dc.subject.jel L31
dc.subject.jel L32
dc.subject.jel H82
dc.subject.jel P13
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00027-5
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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