Implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence by Market Games

e-Archivo Repository

Show simple item record Corchón, Luis C. Beviá, Carmen Wilkie, Simon 2009-03-11T10:55:25Z 2009-03-11T10:55:25Z 2003-02
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Review of Economic Design. 2003, vol. 7, nº 4, p. 429-442
dc.identifier.issn 1434-4750
dc.description.abstract In this paper we present a set of axioms guaranteeing that, in exchange economies with or without indivisible goods, the set of Nash, Strong and active Walrasian Equilibria all coincide in the framework of market games.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Springer
dc.title Implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence by Market Games
dc.type article PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1007/s100580300088
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
 Find Full text

Files in this item

*Click on file's image for preview. (Embargoed files's preview is not supported)

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record