Implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence by Market Games

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dc.contributor.author Corchón, Luis C.
dc.contributor.author Beviá, Carmen
dc.contributor.author Wilkie, Simon
dc.date.accessioned 2009-03-11T10:55:25Z
dc.date.available 2009-03-11T10:55:25Z
dc.date.issued 2003-02
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Review of Economic Design. 2003, vol. 7, nº 4, p. 429-442
dc.identifier.issn 1434-4750
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3799
dc.description.abstract In this paper we present a set of axioms guaranteeing that, in exchange economies with or without indivisible goods, the set of Nash, Strong and active Walrasian Equilibria all coincide in the framework of market games.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Springer
dc.title Implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence by Market Games
dc.type article
dc.type.review PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://www.springerlink.com/content/y6a4vft38kuu6gu7/fulltext.pdf
dc.relation.publisherversion http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s100580300088
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1007/s100580300088
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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