Implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence by Market Games

Corchón, Luis C.; Beviá, Carmen; Wilkie, Simon

dc.contributor.author	Corchón, Luis C.
dc.contributor.author	Beviá, Carmen
dc.contributor.author	Wilkie, Simon
dc.date.accessioned	2009-03-11T10:55:25Z
dc.date.available	2009-03-11T10:55:25Z
dc.date.issued	2003-02
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation	Review of Economic Design. 2003, vol. 7, nº 4, p. 429-442
dc.identifier.issn	1434-4750
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3799
dc.description.abstract	In this paper we present a set of axioms guaranteeing that, in exchange economies with or without indivisible goods, the set of Nash, Strong and active Walrasian Equilibria all coincide in the framework of market games.
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.publisher	Springer
dc.title	Implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence by Market Games
dc.type	article
dc.type.review	PeerReviewed
dc.description.status	Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion	http://www.springerlink.com/content/y6a4vft38kuu6gu7/fulltext.pdf
dc.relation.publisherversion	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s100580300088
dc.subject.eciencia	Economía
dc.identifier.doi	10.1007/s100580300088
dc.rights.accessRights	openAccess