Pigouvian Taxes: A Strategic Approach

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dc.contributor.author Corchón, Luis C.
dc.contributor.author Alcalde, J.
dc.contributor.author Moreno, B.
dc.date.accessioned 2009-03-11T10:03:04Z
dc.date.accessioned 2010-02-08T16:30:01Z
dc.date.available 2009-03-11T10:03:04Z
dc.date.available 2010-02-08T16:30:01Z
dc.date.issued 1999-04
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Journal of Public Economic Theory, April 1999, vol. 1, nº 2, p. 271-281
dc.identifier.issn 1432-0479
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3797
dc.description.abstract This paper analyzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutions in economies with externalities. We provide two simple mechanisms implementing the Pigouvian Social Choice Correspondence in environments in which coalitions can or cannot be formed.
dc.format.mimetype text/plain
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Blackwell
dc.rights The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com
dc.title Pigouvian Taxes: A Strategic Approach
dc.type article
dc.type.review PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1097-3923.00012
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1111/1097-3923.00012
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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