Corporate Downsizing to Rebuild Team Spirit: How Costly Voting Can Foster Cooperation

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dc.contributor.author Cabrales, Antonio
dc.contributor.author Calvó-Armengol, Antoni
dc.date.accessioned 2009-03-10T10:27:16Z
dc.date.available 2009-03-10T10:27:16Z
dc.date.issued 2007
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Journal of the European Economic Association. 2007, vol. 5, nº 5, p.1016-1042
dc.identifier.issn 1542-4766
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3793
dc.description.abstract We propose a new mechanism to achieve coordination through voting, for which we discuss a number of real-life applications. Among them, the mechanism provides for a new theory for downsizing in organizations. A crisis may lead to a decrease in the willingness to cooperate in an organization, and therefore to a bad equilibrium. A consensual downsizing episode may signal credibly that survivors are willing to cooperate, and thus, it may be optimal and efficiency-enhancing (for the individuals remaining in the organization), as the empirical evidence suggests. A variation of the same mechanism leads to “efficient” upsizing.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher MIT Press
dc.rights © 2007 by the European Economic Association
dc.title Corporate Downsizing to Rebuild Team Spirit: How Costly Voting Can Foster Cooperation
dc.type article
dc.type.review PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://www.swetswise.com/eAccess/viewFulltext.do?articleID=35382743
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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