Nash Bargaining with Downward Rigid Wages

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dc.contributor.author Cabrales, Antonio
dc.contributor.author Hopenhayn, Hugo
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-18T11:11:20Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-18T11:11:20Z
dc.date.issued 1997
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Economics Letters. 1997, vol. 57, nº. 2, p. 213-218
dc.identifier.issn 1350-4851
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3707
dc.description.abstract We study the effect of downward wage rigidity in a dynamic model when wages are negotiated according to Nash bargaining. Downward rigidity causes a decrease in the worker’s expected utility. For the firms the effect is ambiguous.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Elsevier
dc.rights © 1997 Elsevier Science S.A.
dc.subject.other Downward wage rigidity
dc.subject.other Nash bargaining
dc.subject.other Labor market flexibility
dc.title Nash Bargaining with Downward Rigid Wages
dc.type article
dc.type.review PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(97)00224-3
dc.subject.jel J30
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1016/S0165-1765(97)00224-3
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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