Nash Bargaining with Downward Rigid Wages

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Show simple item record Cabrales, Antonio Hopenhayn, Hugo 2009-02-18T11:11:20Z 2009-02-18T11:11:20Z 1997
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Economics Letters. 1997, vol. 57, nº. 2, p. 213-218
dc.identifier.issn 1350-4851
dc.description.abstract We study the effect of downward wage rigidity in a dynamic model when wages are negotiated according to Nash bargaining. Downward rigidity causes a decrease in the worker’s expected utility. For the firms the effect is ambiguous.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Elsevier
dc.rights © 1997 Elsevier Science S.A.
dc.subject.other Downward wage rigidity
dc.subject.other Nash bargaining
dc.subject.other Labor market flexibility
dc.title Nash Bargaining with Downward Rigid Wages
dc.type article PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.subject.jel J30
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1016/S0165-1765(97)00224-3
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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