Middlemen: the visible market makers

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dc.contributor.author Watanabe Watanabe, Makoto
dc.date.accessioned 2006-11-09T11:41:46Z
dc.date.available 2006-11-09T11:41:46Z
dc.date.issued 2006-01
dc.identifier.issn 2340-5031
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/369
dc.description.abstract This paper presents a search-theoretic model where middlemen can emerge endogenously to intermediate between ex ante homogeneous buyers and sellers in the presence of coordination frictions. Middlemen set price to compete in the market, and hold an inventory to provide a high matching service. I show that middlemen's inventories can mitigate trade imbalances and interact with price competition, generating an interesting tradeoff for the equilibrium price determination. The competitive limit emerges when middlemen guarantee excess demand will never occur. Conditions are characterized under which middlemen carry out the short-side principle for the market price to be Walrasian.
dc.format.extent 457176 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries UC3M Working Paper. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2006-02
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title Middlemen: the visible market makers
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.identifier.repec we061002
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