Interdependent preferences and segregating equilibria

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Show simple item record Cabrales, Antonio Antoni, Calvó-Armengol 2009-02-16T11:52:51Z 2009-02-16T11:52:51Z 2008
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Journal of Economic Theory. 2008, vol. 139, nº 1, p. 99-113
dc.identifier.issn 0022-0531
dc.description.abstract This paper shows that models where preferences of individuals depend not only on their allocations, but also on the well being of other persons, can produce both large and testable effects. We study the allocation of workers with heterogeneous productivities to firms. We show that even small deviations from purely “selfish” preferences leads to widespread workplace skill segregation. That is, workers of different abilities tend to work in different firms, as long as they care somewhat more about the utilities of workers who are “close”. This result holds for a broad class and distribution of social preferences.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Elsevier
dc.rights © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
dc.subject.other Contract theory
dc.subject.other Mechanism design
dc.subject.other Envy
dc.subject.other Social preferences
dc.subject.other Skill segregation
dc.title Interdependent preferences and segregating equilibria
dc.type article PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.subject.jel A13
dc.subject.jel C72
dc.subject.jel D64
dc.subject.jel D80
dc.subject.jel J41
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1016/j.jet.2007.08.003
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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