Contingent Commodities and Implementation

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Show simple item record Subir, Chattopadhyay Corchón, Luis C. Naeve, Jörg 2009-02-10T10:59:46Z 2009-02-10T10:59:46Z 1998
dc.description.abstract In this note we consider the problem whether contingent commodity allocations can be used when the states are not directly contractible. In such a setting a contigent commodity allocation takes the form of a social choice funtion, and the question in whether this function is implementable (in the sense of full implementation). Using only very mild assumptions on the rule for selecting contingent commodity allocations, we derive a strnog negative result which also proves to be robust with respect to different solution concepts employed for implementation. These findings have interesting implications for the interpretation of Arrow-Debreu economies
dc.format.mimetype application/octet-stream
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Universidad de Bonn
dc.relation penAccess
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working Papers;
dc.relation.ispartofseries 1998
dc.rights openAccess
dc.subject Contingent Commodities
dc.subject Implementation
dc.subject Single-Crossing
dc.title Contingent Commodities and Implementation
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.affiliation.dpto UC3M. Departamento de Economía
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