To Merge or not to Merge: That is the question

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Show simple item record Faulí-Oller, Ramón Corchón, Luis C. 2009-02-09T10:59:44Z 2009-02-09T10:59:44Z 2000
dc.description.abstract In this paper we analyze the implementation of socially optimal mergers when the regulator is not informed about the parameters that determine social and private gains from potential mergers. We ¯nd that most of the standard tools in dominant strategy implementation, like the revelation principle or the Vickrey- Clarke-Groves mechanism can not be applied in our framework. We show that implementation in dominant strategies of the optimal merger policy without budget balance is possible under an additional assumption. The same assumption makes possible the implementation in Nash equilibrium of the optimal merger policy with budget balance.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas (Valencia)
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working Papers;
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2000_01_AD
dc.rights openAccess
dc.subject Merge
dc.subject Antitrust
dc.subject Welfare
dc.title To Merge or not to Merge: That is the question
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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