Rational Sabotage in Cooperative Production with Heterogeneous Agents

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dc.contributor.author Beviá, Carmen
dc.contributor.author Corchón, Luis C.
dc.contributor.editor Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T11:46:42Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T11:46:42Z
dc.date.issued 2006
dc.identifier.issn 2340-5031
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3574
dc.description.abstract We present a model of cooperative production in which rational agents might carry out sabotage activities that decrease output. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium without sabotage. It is shown that the absence of sabotage in equilibrium depends on the interplay between technology, relative productivity of agents and the degree of meritocracy. In particular we show that, ceteris paribus, meritocratic systems give more incentives to sabotage than egalitarian systems.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working Papers;
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2006
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.other Cooperative production
dc.subject.other Sharing rules
dc.subject.other Sabotage
dc.title Rational Sabotage in Cooperative Production with Heterogeneous Agents
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.jel D20
dc.subject.jel D72
dc.subject.jel D78
dc.subject.jel J54
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.identifier.repec we20090204
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