xmlui.dri2xhtml.METS-1.0.item-contributor-funder:
Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (España) Comunidad de Madrid
Sponsor:
We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, grants MDM 2014-0431 and ECO2015-68406-P, as well as from Comunidad de Madrid, grant MadEco-CM.
Project:
Gobierno de España. ECO2015-68406-P Gobierno de España. MDM 2014-0431 Comunidad de Madrid. MadEco-CM
A seller and a buyer bargain over the quantities and prices of multiple goods. Both agents have private information about their preferences. Utility is quasilinear in money. We show that a deterministic mechanism satisfies (i) dominant-strategy incentive compaA seller and a buyer bargain over the quantities and prices of multiple goods. Both agents have private information about their preferences. Utility is quasilinear in money. We show that a deterministic mechanism satisfies (i) dominant-strategy incentive compatibility, (ii) ex-post individual rationality and (iii) ex-post budget balance if and only if it is a posted-price mechanism. A similar, more general result holds if (iii) is replaced by ex-post collusion-proofness and a no-free lunch condition. We provide a unified proof of both findings via the property of non-bossiness.[+][-]