When collective ignorance is bliss: Theory and experiment on voting for learning

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dc.contributor.author Ginzburg, Boris
dc.contributor.author Guerra, Jose Alberto
dc.date.accessioned 2022-07-14T11:16:47Z
dc.date.available 2022-07-14T11:16:47Z
dc.date.issued 2019-01-01
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Ginzburg, B., & Guerra, J.-A. (2019). When collective ignorance is bliss: Theory and experiment on voting for learning. Journal of Public Economics, 169, pp. 52-64.
dc.identifier.issn 0047-2727
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/35462
dc.description.abstract When do groups and societies choose to be uninformed? We study a committee that needs to vote on a reform which will give every member a private state-dependent payoff. The committee can vote to learn the state at no cost. We show that the committee votes not to learn the state whenever independent voters are more divided than partisans. This implies that groups with conflicting preferences tend to seek less information. A laboratory experiment shows that committees are substantially more likely to vote against acquiring information when the theory predicts them to do so. We also observe deviations from theory that are largely explained by cognitive limitations. At the same time, subjects with more experience or with greater strategic competence are more likely to vote in line with the theory, providing evidence for external validity of the model.
dc.description.sponsorship We thank Universidad del Rosario for hosting the experiment, and the financial support from Central Bank of Colombia grant 3754, Spanish Ministry of the Economy grant MDM 2014-0431, and Comunidad de Madrid grant S2015/HUM-3444
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Elsevier
dc.rights © 2018 Elsevier
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.other Voting
dc.subject.other Collective learning
dc.subject.other Reform adoption
dc.subject.other Preference heterogeneity
dc.subject.other Laboratory experiment
dc.title When collective ignorance is bliss: Theory and experiment on voting for learning
dc.type article
dc.subject.jel D72
dc.subject.jel D83
dc.subject.jel C92
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.10.010
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.relation.projectID Comunidad de Madrid. S2015/HUM-3444
dc.relation.projectID Gobierno de España. MDM 2014-0431
dc.type.version acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage 52
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage 64
dc.identifier.publicationtitle JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
dc.identifier.publicationvolume 169
dc.identifier.uxxi AR/0000023086
dc.contributor.funder Comunidad de Madrid
dc.contributor.funder Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (España)
dc.affiliation.dpto UC3M. Departamento de Economía
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