Cooperative production and efficiency

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dc.contributor.author Beviá, Carmen
dc.contributor.author Corchón, Luis C.
dc.date.accessioned 2009-01-30T10:40:42Z
dc.date.available 2009-01-30T10:40:42Z
dc.date.issued 2008
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Mathematical Social Sciences. ( Octubre 2008), p. 1-12
dc.identifier.issn 0165-4896
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3545
dc.description.abstract We characterize the sharing rule for which a contribution mechanism achieves efficiency in a cooperative production setting when agents are heterogeneous. This rule differs from the one obtained by Sen for the case of identical agents. We also show for a large class of sharing rules that if Nash equilibrium yields efficient allocations, the production function displays constant returns to scale, a case in which cooperation in production is useless.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Elsevier
dc.subject.other Cooperative production
dc.subject.other Efficiency
dc.subject.other Incentives
dc.title Cooperative production and efficiency
dc.type article
dc.type.review PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.09.006
dc.subject.jel C72
dc.subject.jel D02
dc.subject.jel D61
dc.subject.jel D71
dc.subject.jel L30
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.09.006
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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