Cooperative production and efficiency

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Show simple item record Beviá, Carmen Corchón, Luis C. 2009-01-30T10:40:42Z 2009-01-30T10:40:42Z 2008
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Mathematical Social Sciences. ( Octubre 2008), p. 1-12
dc.identifier.issn 0165-4896
dc.description.abstract We characterize the sharing rule for which a contribution mechanism achieves efficiency in a cooperative production setting when agents are heterogeneous. This rule differs from the one obtained by Sen for the case of identical agents. We also show for a large class of sharing rules that if Nash equilibrium yields efficient allocations, the production function displays constant returns to scale, a case in which cooperation in production is useless.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Elsevier
dc.subject.other Cooperative production
dc.subject.other Efficiency
dc.subject.other Incentives
dc.title Cooperative production and efficiency
dc.type article PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.subject.jel C72
dc.subject.jel D02
dc.subject.jel D61
dc.subject.jel D71
dc.subject.jel L30
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.09.006
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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