xmlui.dri2xhtml.METS-1.0.item-contributor-funder:
Comunidad de Madrid Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (España)
Sponsor:
Support from the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Spain) grant MDM 2014-
0431, and Comunidad de Madrid grant MadEco-CM (S2015/HUM-3444), is gratefully
acknowledged.
Project:
Comunidad de Madrid. S2015/HUM-3444 Gobierno de España. MDM 2014- 0431
This paper analyses Bayesian persuasion of a privately informed receiver in a linear framework. The sender is restricted to censorship, that is, to strategies in which each state is either perfectly revealed or hidden. I develop a new approach to finding optimThis paper analyses Bayesian persuasion of a privately informed receiver in a linear framework. The sender is restricted to censorship, that is, to strategies in which each state is either perfectly revealed or hidden. I develop a new approach to finding optimal censorship strategies based on direct optimisation. I also show how this approach can be used to restrict the set of optimal censorship schemes, and to analyse optimal censorship under certain classes of distributions of the receiver’s type.[+][-]