Foundations for contest success functions

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dc.contributor.author Corchón, Luis C.
dc.contributor.author Dahm, Matthias
dc.date.accessioned 2009-01-30T09:33:30Z
dc.date.available 2009-01-30T09:33:30Z
dc.date.issued 2008
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Economic Theory. 2008, p. 1-18
dc.identifier.issn 1432-0479
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3543
dc.description.abstract In the literature the outcome of contests is either interpreted as win probabilities or as shares of the prize. With this in mind, we examine two approaches to contest success functions. In the rst we analyze the implications of contestants' incomplete information concerning the 'type'of the contest administrator. While in the case of two contestants this approach can rationalize prominent contest success functions, we show that it runs into di¢ culties when there are more agents. Our second approach interprets contest success functions as sharing rules and establishes a connection to bargaining and claims problems which is independent of the number of contestants. Both approaches provide foundations for popular contest success functions and guidelines for the de nition of new ones.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Springer
dc.subject.other Endogenous Contests
dc.subject.other Contest Success Function
dc.title Foundations for contest success functions
dc.type article
dc.type.review PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://www.springerlink.com/content/rq5w1q3333u87211/fulltext.pdf
dc.relation.publisherversion http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0425-x
dc.subject.jel C72
dc.subject.jel D72
dc.subject.jel D74
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1007/s00199-008-0425-x
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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