Managerial incentives for attracting attention

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Show simple item record Gutiérrez, María Papiashvili, Nino Tribó, Josep A. Vázquez, Antonio B. 2022-07-04T13:53:36Z 2022-07-04T13:53:36Z 2020-09-02
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Gutiérrez, M., Papiashvili, N., Tribó, J. A., & Vazquez, A. B. (2019). Managerial incentives for attracting attention. European Financial Management, 26, pp. 896–937
dc.identifier.issn 1354-7798
dc.description.abstract This paper studies the mechanisms which motivate managers to engage in cheap talk and attract the market's attention in a credible way. We consider stock split announcements, voluntary earnings forecasts, and press releases issued by firms to the media as proxies for managerial cheap talk. We show that: (a) managerial performance-related pay contracts incentivize executives to attract attention; (b) analysts increase their coverage of firms following cheap talk; and (c) chief executive officers are punished for attracting attention when market prices do not increase following cheap talk. The results are stronger for firms which are most in need of attention.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
dc.rights © John Wiley & Sons, Inc
dc.subject.other Attracting attention
dc.subject.other Ceo compensation
dc.subject.other Cheap talk
dc.subject.other Managerial incentives
dc.subject.other Voluntary disclosures
dc.title Managerial incentives for attracting attention
dc.type article
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.relation.projectID Gobierno de España. ECO2009-08308
dc.relation.projectID Gobierno de España. ECO2009-10796
dc.relation.projectID Gobierno de España. ECO2012-36559
dc.relation.projectID Comunidad de Madrid. S2015/HUM-3353
dc.relation.projectID Gobierno de España. ECO2015-68715-R
dc.relation.projectID Gobierno de España. UNC315-EE-3636
dc.relation.projectID Indefinido. Cofinan UC3M
dc.type.version acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage 896
dc.identifier.publicationissue 4
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage 937
dc.identifier.publicationtitle European Financial Management
dc.identifier.publicationvolume 26
dc.identifier.uxxi AR/0000025049
dc.affiliation.dpto UC3M. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa
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