Citation:
Denter, P., Morgan, J., & Sisak, D. (2022). Showing Off or Laying Low? The Economics of Psych-outs. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 14 (1), pp. 529-580.
xmlui.dri2xhtml.METS-1.0.item-contributor-funder:
Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (España) Agencia Estatal de Investigación (España)
Sponsor:
Denter and Sisak gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Swiss National Science Foundation
through grants PBSGP1-135426 (Denter) and PBSGP1-130765 (Sisak). Denter gratefully acknowledges the support
from the Ministerio Economia y Competitividad (Spain) through grants ECO2014-55953-P, MDM 2014-0431, and PGC2018-098510-B-I00.
Project:
Gobierno de España. ECO2014-55953-P Gobierno de España. PGC2018-098510-B-I00 Gobierno de España. MDM 2014-0431
Keywords:
Showing off
,
Norms
,
Selection
,
Contests
We analyze the incentives for showing off, which we model as a costly signaling game, and study the consequences of norms against such behavior. Prior to competing in a contest, a newcomer can signal his talent to an incumbent. In equilibrium, costly signalingWe analyze the incentives for showing off, which we model as a costly signaling game, and study the consequences of norms against such behavior. Prior to competing in a contest, a newcomer can signal his talent to an incumbent. In equilibrium, costly signaling of ability occurs only when the newcomer is exceptionally talented. In such situations signaling benefits both contestants: the newcomer for obvious reasons; the incumbent by economizing on wasted effort in the contest. Our results rationalize the emergence of norms against showing off in settings where total effort is important. When selection efficiency matters, such norms decrease welfare[+][-]