Who acquires information in dealer markets?

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dc.contributor.author Rüdiger Sorensen, Jesper
dc.contributor.author Vigier, Adrien
dc.date.accessioned 2022-04-20T17:20:41Z
dc.date.available 2022-04-20T17:20:41Z
dc.date.issued 2020-04-01
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Rüdiger, J., & Vigier, A. (2020). Who Acquires Information in Dealer Markets? En American Economic Review, 110 (4), pp. 1145-1176.
dc.identifier.issn 0002-8282
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/34583
dc.description.abstract We study information acquisition in dealer markets. We first identify a one- sided strategic complementarity in information acquisition: the more informed traders are, the larger market makers’ gain from becoming informed. When quotes are observable, this effect in turn induces a strategic complementarity in information acquisition amongst market makers. We then derive the equilibrium pattern of information acquisition and examine the implications of our analysis for market liquidity and price discovery. We show that increasing the cost of information can decrease market liquidity and improve price discovery.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher American Economic Association
dc.rights © The Author(s)
dc.title Who acquires information in dealer markets?
dc.type article
dc.subject.jel O82
dc.subject.jel O83
dc.subject.jel G14
dc.identifier.doi https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20170690
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.type.version publishedVersion
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage 1145
dc.identifier.publicationissue 4
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage 1176
dc.identifier.publicationtitle AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
dc.identifier.publicationvolume 110
dc.identifier.uxxi AR/0000025055
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