Dynamic persuasion with outside information

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dc.contributor.author Bizzotto, Jacopo
dc.contributor.author Rüdiger Sorensen, Jesper
dc.contributor.author Vigier, Adrien
dc.date.accessioned 2022-04-20T16:27:45Z
dc.date.available 2022-04-20T16:27:45Z
dc.date.issued 2021-02-01
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Bizzotto, J., Rüdiger, J., & Vigier, A. (2021). Dynamic Persuasion with Outside Information. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 13 (1), pp. 179-194.
dc.identifier.issn 1945-7669
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/34582
dc.description.abstract A principal seeks to persuade an agent to accept an offer of uncertain value before a deadline expires. The principal can generate information, but exerts no control over exogenous outside information. The combined effect of the deadline and outside information creates incentives for the principal to keep uncertainty high in the first periods so as to persuade the agent close to the deadline. We characterize the equilibrium, compare it to the single-player decision problem in which exogenous outside information is the agent's only source of information, and examine the welfare implications of our analysis.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher American Economic Association
dc.rights © The Author(s)
dc.title Dynamic persuasion with outside information
dc.type article
dc.subject.jel C73
dc.subject.jel D82
dc.subject.jel D83
dc.subject.eciencia Empresa
dc.identifier.doi https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20180141
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.type.version publishedVersion
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage 179
dc.identifier.publicationissue 1
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage 194
dc.identifier.publicationtitle American Economic Journal-Microeconomics
dc.identifier.publicationvolume 13
dc.identifier.uxxi AR/0000027541
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