Fiscal federalism with a single instrument to finance government

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dc.contributor.author Maravall Rodríguez, Carlos
dc.date.accessioned 2006-11-09T11:37:10Z
dc.date.available 2006-11-09T11:37:10Z
dc.date.issued 2005-04
dc.identifier.issn 2340-5031
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/342
dc.description.abstract The structure of each level of government in the United States has changed over the last 200 years. Wallis (2000) has presented empirical evidence that relates the dominance of each level not to the functions government decides to undertake (the expenditures it commits to), but to the costs and benefits of the financial instruments each level has available (the way each level extracts revenues). In this paper we provide theoretical evidence for this hypothesis. We show why two different levels of government (e.g. state and federal) would not want to use a common instrument to finance the same good.
dc.format.extent 345965 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries UC3M Working Paper. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2005-13
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title Fiscal federalism with a single instrument to finance government
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.identifier.repec we052213
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