Bargaining power as moderator of the 'delay costs effect' in supply chain negotiations

e-Archivo Repository

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author Núñez-Nickel, Manuel
dc.contributor.author Gago-Rodríguez, Susana
dc.contributor.author Márquez Illescas, Gilberto
dc.date.accessioned 2022-02-21T16:32:13Z
dc.date.available 2022-02-21T16:32:13Z
dc.date.issued 2021-06-01
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Gago-Rodríguez, S., Márquez-Illescas, G., & Núñez-Nickel, M. (2021). Bargaining power as moderator of the “delay costs effect” in supply chain negotiations. In Management Accounting Research, 51, p. 100737
dc.identifier.issn 1044-5005
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/34190
dc.description.abstract This paper explores the extent to which bargaining power asymmetries among supply chain members moderate the effect that the delay costs of the setting exert on negotiation outcomes. First, we propose that the influence of delay costs on the initial gap between the bargaining demands of sellers and buyers (i.e., initial bargaining gap) decreases when buyers have a bargaining power advantage over sellers. Second, we posit that this moderation effect reduces the indirect effect that the delay costs have on negotiation outcomes (via the initial bargaining gap). To test these notions, we conduct a 2 × 2 between-subjects experiment with undergraduate students from a large European university in which we manipulate the relative bargaining power and delay costs of the setting. We conduct our analysis with 292 observations. Our findings support our theoretical predictions. Specifically, results indicate that bargaining power moderates (i.e., reduces) the effect of the delay costs on negotiation processes by reducing their influence on the initial bargaining gap. Likewise, our analysis shows that because more powerful buyers are less likely to modify their behavior as a result of the delay costs, they face a higher risk of obtaining suboptimal bargaining profits.
dc.description.sponsorship This work was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness under Grants ECO2013-45864-P and ECO2017-87514-P; Community of Madrid (Grant S2015/HUM-3417 and Programa Excelencia para el Profesorado Universitario, convenio con Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, V Plan Regional de Investigación Científica e Innovación Tecnológica); and FEDER under Grant UNC315-EE-3636.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Elsevier
dc.rights © 2021 The Authors.
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.other Delay costs
dc.subject.other Initial bargaining gap
dc.subject.other Relative bargaining power
dc.subject.other Supply chain negotiations
dc.title Bargaining power as moderator of the 'delay costs effect' in supply chain negotiations
dc.type article
dc.subject.eciencia Empresa
dc.identifier.doi https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mar.2021.100737
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.relation.projectID Gobierno de España. ECO2013-45864-P
dc.relation.projectID Comunidad de Madrid. S2015/HUM-3417
dc.relation.projectID Gobierno de España. UNC315-EE-3636
dc.relation.projectID Gobierno de España. ECO2017-87514-P
dc.type.version publishedVersion
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage 1
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage 10
dc.identifier.publicationtitle Management Accounting Research
dc.identifier.publicationvolume 51
dc.identifier.uxxi AR/0000028742
dc.contributor.funder Ministerio de Asuntos Económicos y Transformación Digital (España)
dc.contributor.funder Comunidad de Madrid
 Find Full text

Files in this item

*Click on file's image for preview. (Embargoed files's preview is not supported)


The following license files are associated with this item:

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record