Citation:
Moreno, D., Rodríguez, R., & Zambrana, R. (2018). Management sub-advising in the mutual fund industry. Journal of Financial Economics , 127 (3), pp. 567-587
xmlui.dri2xhtml.METS-1.0.item-contributor-funder:
Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad (España) Comunidad de Madrid
Sponsor:
Rafael Zambrana acknowledges financial support from the FCT Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia under the project UID/ECO/00124/2013 and POR Lisboa (LISBOA-01-0145-FEDER-007722). David Moreno and Rosa Rodríguez thank financial support from Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad (through projects ECO2016- 77807-P and ECO2015-67035-P), WRDS-UC3M (FEDER UNCC315-EE-3636), CAM grant S2015/HUM-3353 (EARLYFIN-CM) and Bank of Spain (grant PR71/15-20229).
Project:
Comunidad de Madrid. S2015/HUM-3353 Gobierno de España. ECO2016-77807-P
This is a study of how contractual mechanisms can mitigate agency conflicts in sub-advised mutual funds. Sub-advising contracts allow fund families to expand their product offerings to include new investment styles and thereby gain market share. We show thaThis is a study of how contractual mechanisms can mitigate agency conflicts in sub-advised mutual funds. Sub-advising contracts allow fund families to expand their product offerings to include new investment styles and thereby gain market share. We show that costly contractual arrangements, such as co-branding, multi-advising, and performance-based compensation, can mitigate agency conflicts in outsourcing and protect investors from potential underperformance. Fund families will find it cost-effective to implement such incentive mechanisms only when investors are sophisticated in assessing manager skill. The findings help to explain why a large percentage of fund families outsource their funds to advisory firms.[+][-]