Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets

Romero-Medina, Antonio; Triossi Verondini, Matteo Maria

Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets

Author(s): Romero-Medina, Antonio; Triossi Verondini, Matteo Maria

Publisher: Springer Nature

Issued date: 2021-03

Citation: Romero-Medina, A. & Triossi, M. (2020). Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets. International Journal of Game Theory, 50(1), pp. 105–118.

ISSN: 0020-7276

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00741-1

xmlui.dri2xhtml.METS-1.0.item-contributor-funder: Comunidad de Madrid
Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (España)
Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (España)

Sponsor: We thank the associate editor and the two reviewers for their careful reading of our manuscript and their many insightful comments and suggestions. Both authors acknowledge financial support from Ministerio Economía y Competitividad (Spain) under project ECO2017-87769-P and from Fondecyt under project No. 1151230. Romero-Medina acknowledges the financial support from Ministerio Economía y Competitividad (Spain) MDM 2014-0431, and Comunidad de Madrid H2019/HUM-5891. Triossi acknowledges the financial support from the Institute for Research in Market Imperfections and Public Policy, ICM IS130002, Ministerio de Economía, Fomento y Turismo (Chile), and from Ca' Foscari University of Venice under project MAN.INS_TRIOSSI.

Project: Gobierno de España. ECO2017-87769-P
Comunidad de Madrid. H2019/HUM-5891
Gobierno de España. MDM-2014-0431

Keywords: Acyclicity , Many-to-many , Stability , Strategy-proofness

URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/33439

Rights: © The Author(s) 2020.
Atribución 3.0 España

Abstract:

We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many-to-many matching markets under responsiveness of agents’ preferences. We show that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers the set of stable matchings is a singleton, and the worker [+]

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