Citation:
Romero-Medina, A. & Triossi, M. (2020). Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets. International Journal of Game Theory, 50(1), pp. 105–118.
xmlui.dri2xhtml.METS-1.0.item-contributor-funder:
Comunidad de Madrid Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (España) Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (España)
Sponsor:
We thank the associate editor and the two reviewers for their careful reading of our manuscript and their many insightful comments and suggestions. Both authors acknowledge financial support from Ministerio Economía y Competitividad (Spain) under project ECO2017-87769-P and from Fondecyt under project No. 1151230. Romero-Medina acknowledges the financial support from Ministerio Economía y Competitividad (Spain) MDM 2014-0431, and Comunidad de Madrid H2019/HUM-5891. Triossi acknowledges the financial support from the Institute for Research in Market Imperfections and Public Policy, ICM IS130002, Ministerio de Economía, Fomento y Turismo (Chile), and from Ca' Foscari University of Venice under project MAN.INS_TRIOSSI.
Project:
Gobierno de España. ECO2017-87769-P Comunidad de Madrid. H2019/HUM-5891 Gobierno de España. MDM-2014-0431
We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many-to-many matching markets under responsiveness of agents’ preferences. We show that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers the set of stable matchings is a singleton, and the workerWe study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many-to-many matching markets under responsiveness of agents’ preferences. We show that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers the set of stable matchings is a singleton, and the worker-optimal stable mechanism is a stable and group strategy-proof rule for firms and workers. Furthermore, acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms in many-to-many matching markets.[+][-]