On the pro-competitive effects of passive partial backward ownership

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dc.contributor.author Alipranti, Maria
dc.contributor.author Petrakis, Emmanuel
dc.contributor.author Skartados, Panagiotis
dc.contributor.editor Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
dc.date.accessioned 2021-09-14T16:17:47Z
dc.date.available 2021-09-14T16:17:47Z
dc.date.issued 2021-09-14
dc.identifier.issn 2340-5031
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/33271
dc.description.abstract We consider a vertically related market in which an upstream monopolist supplier trades, via interim observable two-part tariff contracts, with two differentiated goods' downstream Cournot competitors. We show that passive partial backward ownership (PPBO) may be pro-competitive and welfare enhancing. PPBO exacerbates the upstream's commitment problem and yields lower wholesale prices, and higher industry output, consumers surplus, and welfare than in the absence of PPBO.
dc.description.sponsorship Petrakis acknowledges financial support from “UC3M-Santander Chairs of Excellence"
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries 21-07
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.other Passive Partial Backward Ownership
dc.subject.other Vertical Relations
dc.subject.other Two-Part Tariffs
dc.subject.other Interim Observable Contracts
dc.title On the pro-competitive effects of passive partial backward ownership
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.jel D43
dc.subject.jel L13
dc.subject.jel L14
dc.identifier.uxxi DT/0000001924
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