Wage Bargaining in Industries with Market Power

e-Archivo Repository

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author Padilla, A. Jorge
dc.contributor.author Bentolila, Samuel
dc.contributor.author Dolado, Juan José
dc.date.accessioned 2008-12-11T10:40:16Z
dc.date.available 2008-12-11T10:40:16Z
dc.date.issued 1996-12
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1996, 5, 4, p. 535-564
dc.identifier.issn 1530-9134
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3304
dc.description.abstract We develop a game-theoretic version of the right-to-manage model of firm-level bargaining where strategic interactions among firms are explicitly recognized. Our main aim is to investigate how equilibrium wages and employment react to changes in various labor and product market variables. We show that our comparative statics results hinge crucially on the strategic nature of the game, which in turn is determined by the relative bargaining power of unions and managers.
dc.format.mimetype text/html
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Blackwell
dc.title Wage Bargaining in Industries with Market Power
dc.type article
dc.type.review PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119223804/PDFSTART
dc.relation.publisherversion http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00535.x
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00535.x
dc.rights.accessRights closedAccess
 Find Full text

Files in this item

*Click on file's image for preview. (Embargoed files's preview is not supported)


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record