Land reform and rural conflict: evidence from 1930s Spain

Abstract

We use a novel high-frequency, municipality-level dataset to examine the impact of land reform on rural conflict in 1930s Spain, a classical example of property rights reform in a developing economy. We distinguish between types of implementation and consider five types of conflicts: land invasions, peasant strikes, clashes, petty theft and attacks on land owner assets. By performing a differences-indifferences regression analysis, we document three main results. First, overall, land reform only increased the number of reported petty thefts, lasting around two years, followed by a reversion to pre-reform levels. Second, the effects of land reform depend on its implementation. A technical implementation was conducive, if anything, to fewer conflicts (clashes and attacks). In contrast, a more political implementation (which gave, on average, less land per peasant) increased reported petty theft sand, to a lower extent, attacks on owners'assets. Third, we provide suggestive evidence that the fall in income of settlers (the, a priori, benefficiaries) explains the increase in social conflict. Our results highlight the importance of the design and implementation of social policies, especially in the context of an agrarian economy.