A fair procedure in a marriage market

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dc.contributor.author Kuvalekar, Aditya Vijay
dc.contributor.author Romero-Medina, Antonio
dc.contributor.editor Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
dc.date.accessioned 2021-01-13T16:08:33Z
dc.date.available 2021-01-13T16:08:33Z
dc.date.issued 2021-01-13
dc.identifier.issn 2340-5031
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/31711
dc.description.abstract We propose a new algorithm in the two-sided marriage market wherein both sides of the market propose in each round. The algorithm always yields astable matching. Moreover, the outcome is often a non-extremal matching, and in fact, is a Rawlsian stable matching if the matching market is "balanced." Lastly, the algorithm can be computed in polynomial time and, hence, from a practical standpoint, can be used in markets in which fairness considerations are important.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries 21-01
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.other Two-Sided Matching
dc.subject.other Fair Procedure
dc.subject.other Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
dc.title A fair procedure in a marriage market
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.jel C72
dc.subject.jel C78
dc.subject.jel D41
dc.identifier.uxxi DT/0000001861
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