Forms of governance and the size of rent-seeking

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Show simple item record Corchón, Luis C.
dc.contributor.editor Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía 2006-11-09T11:31:44Z 2006-11-09T11:31:44Z 2004-04
dc.identifier.issn 2340-5031
dc.description.abstract In this paper we present a model of an organization where agents can choose between productive and rent-seeking activities. We consider two governance institutions, single ownership and corporate governance or parliament rule. Applications include models of internal organization of a firm, of a kingdom ruled either by an absolute monarch or by the parliament, and location where agents can locate either in the court and become rent-seekers, or in an industrial city and become entrepreneurs. Our main goal is to study the size of rent-seeking activities under the two governance regimes. Under single ownership, rent-seeking reflects the taste of the owner for such activities and the possibilities of extracting rents from productive agents (who finance rent-seeking). The main conclusion of the paper is that, under corporate governance, the size of the rent-seeking sector may be larger than under single ownership despite the fact that in the former nobody has an intrinsic taste for rent-seeking activities.
dc.format.extent 510165 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries UC3M Working Paper. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2004-05
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.title Forms of governance and the size of rent-seeking
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.identifier.repec we041905
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