Fair linking mechanisms for resource allocation with correlated player types

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dc.contributor.author Santos Méndez, Agustín
dc.contributor.author Fernández Anta, Antonio
dc.contributor.author Cuesta, José A.
dc.contributor.author López Fernández, Luis
dc.date.accessioned 2020-06-04T07:44:13Z
dc.date.available 2020-06-04T07:44:13Z
dc.date.issued 2016-08-01
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Computing, (2016), 98(8), (Special issue on NETYS’14 selected papers), p.: 777–801.
dc.identifier.issn 0010-485X
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/30554
dc.description.abstract Resource allocation is one of the most relevant problems in the area of Mechanism Design for computing systems. Devising algorithms capable of providing efficient and fair allocation is the objective of many previous research efforts. Usually, the mechanisms they propose deal with selfishness by introducing utility transfers or payments. Since using payments is undesirable in some contexts, a family of mechanisms without payments is proposed in this paper. These mechanisms extend the Linking Mechanism of Jackson and Sonnenschein introducing a generic concept of fairness with correlated preferences. We prove that these mechanisms have good incentive, fairness, and efficiency properties. To conclude, we provide an algorithm, based on the mechanisms, that could be used in practical computing environments.
dc.format.extent 24
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Springer
dc.relation.ispartof http://hdl.handle.net/10016/21425
dc.rights © Springer-Verlag Wien 2015
dc.subject.other Resource allocation
dc.subject.other Task allocation
dc.subject.other Linking mechanism
dc.subject.other Fairness
dc.subject.other Player correlation
dc.title Fair linking mechanisms for resource allocation with correlated player types
dc.type article
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.subject.eciencia Informática
dc.subject.eciencia Matemáticas
dc.identifier.doi https://doi.org/10.1007/s00607-015-0461-x
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.type.version submittedVersion
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage 777
dc.identifier.publicationissue 8
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage 801
dc.identifier.publicationtitle Computing
dc.identifier.publicationvolume 98
dc.identifier.uxxi AR/0000018138
dc.affiliation.dpto UC3M. Departamento de Matemáticas
dc.affiliation.grupoinv UC3M. Grupo de Investigación: Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos (GISC)
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