Can job competition prevent hold-ups?

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dc.contributor.author Jansen, Marcel
dc.date.accessioned 2006-11-09T11:26:47Z
dc.date.available 2006-11-09T11:26:47Z
dc.date.issued 2003-12
dc.identifier.issn 2340-5031
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/302
dc.description.abstract We consider an economy in which firms need to invest in capital before they can advertise a job, while applicants may have to compete for jobs. Our aim to investigate how this competition affects the investment decisions of firms. Our first finding shows that the economy always generates the right number of jobs. However, with random search firms under-invest in capital. In contrast, if workers can direct their search towards firms with different capital levels, the equilibrium is efficient. This result contrasts sharply with the predictions of models with ex post wage bargaining that never yield an efficien allocation. Moreover, our results extend the efficiency of auction mechanisms to an environment with non-contractible investments.
dc.format.extent 592977 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries UC3M Working Paper. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2003-20
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title Can job competition prevent hold-ups?
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.identifier.repec we035120
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