Bargaining and matching in small markets

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Show simple item record Wooders, John
dc.contributor.editor Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía 2008-09-24T09:35:52Z 2008-09-24T09:35:52Z 1994-08
dc.identifier.issn 2340-5031
dc.description.abstract The present paper focuses on markets where trade is carried out through matching and bargaining and where at each date t = 0,1, ... a finite and exogenously given number of agents enters. Such markets are "small" in the sense that whether a match ends with trade influences matching probabilities at subsequent dates. For a small market we show that as the market becomes large, the equilibrium of the small market converges to the equilibrium of a limit market with a continuum of agents. Nonetheless, for any small market there exists a matching process such that the equilibrium of the small market significantly differs from the equilibrium of the associated large market with a continuum of agents, although equilibrium-path matching probabilities are the same in both markets. Therefore, matching models with a continuum of agents are not always a good approximation of small markets.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries UC3M Working Papers. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries 1994-56-28
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.subject.other Matching
dc.subject.other Bargaining
dc.subject.other Market equilibrium
dc.title Bargaining and matching in small markets
dc.type workingPaper
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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