Strategy-proof mechanisms with monotonic preferences: The case of pure public goods economies

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dc.contributor.author Moreno, Diego
dc.contributor.editor Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
dc.date.accessioned 2008-09-04T09:55:27Z
dc.date.available 2008-09-04T09:55:27Z
dc.date.issued 1994-11
dc.identifier.issn 2340-5031
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/2919
dc.description.abstract This paper explores a typical public finance problem where there are m public goods (education, transportation, police, etc.) provided in limited amounts due to budget constraints, and where individual's preferences are not known. It is shown that all institutions (i.e., decision mechanisms) available to decide the allocation of goods have very unattractive properties: either the decision mechanisms are not compatible with individual's incentives, or they are dictatorial (i.e, they are based on a single individual's preferences).
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries UC3M Working Papers. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries 1994-24-14
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title Strategy-proof mechanisms with monotonic preferences: The case of pure public goods economies
dc.type workingPaper
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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