Network slicing games: Enabling customization in multi-tenant networks

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dc.contributor.author Caballero Garcés, Pablo
dc.contributor.author Banchs Roca, Albert
dc.contributor.author De Veciana, Gustavo
dc.contributor.author Costa-Pérez, Xavier
dc.date.accessioned 2019-07-30T08:47:56Z
dc.date.available 2019-07-30T08:47:56Z
dc.date.issued 2017-05-01
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation iEEE INFOCOM 2017 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications.
dc.identifier.isbn 978-1-5090-5336-0
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/28659
dc.description IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (IEEE INFOCOM 2017)
dc.description.abstract Network slicing to enable resource sharing among multiple tenants-network operators and/or services-is considered a key functionality for next generation mobile networks. This paper provides an analysis of a well-known model for resource sharing, the `share-constrained proportional allocation' mechanism, to realize network slicing. This mechanism enables tenants to reap the performance benefits of sharing, while retaining the ability to customize their own users' allocation. This results in a network slicing game in which each tenant reacts to the user allocations of the other tenants so as to maximize its own utility. We show that, under appropriate conditions, the game associated with such strategic behavior converges to a Nash equilibrium. At the Nash equilibrium, a tenant always achieves the same, or better, performance than under a static partitioning of resources, hence providing the same level of protection as such static partitioning. We further analyze the efficiency and fairness of the resulting allocations, providing tight bounds for the price of anarchy and envy-freeness. Our analysis and extensive simulation results confirm that the mechanism provides a comprehensive practical solution to realize network slicing. Our theoretical results also fill a gap in the literature regarding the analysis of this resource allocation model under strategic players.
dc.description.sponsorship The work of P. Caballero and G. de Veciana has been supported by NSF Award CNS1232283, and the work of A. Banchs and X. Costa-Perez by the H2020-ICT-2014-2 project 5G NORMA under Grant Agreement No. 671584.
dc.format.extent 9
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher IEEE
dc.rights © 2017 IEEE.
dc.title Network slicing games: Enabling customization in multi-tenant networks
dc.type bookPart
dc.type conferenceObject
dc.subject.eciencia Telecomunicaciones
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/671584
dc.type.version acceptedVersion
dc.relation.eventdate 01-04 May 2017
dc.relation.eventplace Atlanta, EEUU.
dc.relation.eventtitle IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (IEEE INFOCOM 2017)
dc.relation.eventtype proceeding
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage 1
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage 9
dc.identifier.publicationtitle IEEE INFOCOM 2017 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications
dc.identifier.uxxi CC/0000028689
dc.contributor.funder European Commission
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