Citation:
Antonioni, A., Sánchez, A. y Tomassini, M. (2016). Cooperation Survives and Cheating Pays in a Dynamic Network Structure with Unreliable Reputation. Scientific Reports, 6, 27160.
xmlui.dri2xhtml.METS-1.0.item-contributor-funder:
European Commission Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (España)
Sponsor:
A. A. gratefully acknowledges financial support by the Swiss National Science Foundation (under grants no. 200020-143224, CR13I1-138032 and P2LAP1-161864) and by the Rectors’ Conference of the Swiss Universities (under grant no. 26058983). All authors acknowledge financial support to carry out the experiments by the Faculty of Business and Economics of the University of Lausanne and the fundamental support by Prof. Rafael Lalive. This work has been supported in part by the European Commission through FET Open RIA 662725 (IBSEN) and by the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Spain) under grant FIS2015-64349-P (VARIANCE).
Project:
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/662725 Gobierno de España. FIS2015-64349-P
In a networked society like ours, reputation is an indispensable tool to guide decisions about social or economic interactions with individuals otherwise unknown. Usually, information about prospective counterparts is incomplete, often being limited to an averIn a networked society like ours, reputation is an indispensable tool to guide decisions about social or economic interactions with individuals otherwise unknown. Usually, information about prospective counterparts is incomplete, often being limited to an average success rate. Uncertainty on reputation is further increased by fraud, which is increasingly becoming a cause of concern. To address these issues, we have designed an experiment based on the Prisoner's Dilemma as a model for social interactions. Participants could spend money to have their observable cooperativeness increased. We find that the aggregate cooperation level is practically unchanged, i.e., global behavior does not seem to be affected by unreliable reputations. However, at the individual level we find two distinct types of behavior, one of reliable subjects and one of cheaters, where the latter artificially fake their reputation in almost every interaction.[+][-]