Collaborative hierarchy maintains cooperation in asymmetric games

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dc.contributor.author Antonioni, Alberto
dc.contributor.author Pereda García, María
dc.contributor.author Cronin, K. A.
dc.contributor.author Tomassini, M.
dc.contributor.author Sánchez, Angel
dc.date.accessioned 2019-09-03T12:10:14Z
dc.date.available 2019-09-03T12:10:14Z
dc.date.issued 2018-03-29
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Antonioni, A., Pereda, M., Cronin, K. A., Tomassini, M. y Sánchez, A. (2018). Collaborative hierarchy maintains cooperation in asymmetric games. Scientific Reports,8, 5375.
dc.identifier.issn 2045-2322
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/28622
dc.description.abstract The interplay of social structure and cooperative behavior is under much scrutiny lately as behavior in social contexts becomes increasingly relevant for everyday life. Earlier experimental work showed that the existence of a social hierarchy, earned through competition, was detrimental for the evolution of cooperative behaviors. Here, we study the case in which individuals are ranked in a hierarchical structure based on their performance in a collective effort by having them play a Public Goods Game. In the first treatment, participants are ranked according to group earnings while, in the second treatment, their rankings are based on individual earnings. Subsequently, participants play asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma games where higher-ranked players gain more than lower ones. Our experiments show that there are no detrimental effects of the hierarchy formed based on group performance, yet when ranking is assigned individually we observe a decrease in cooperation. Our results show that different levels of cooperation arise from the fact that subjects are interpreting rankings as a reputation which carries information about which subjects were cooperators in the previous phase. Our results demonstrate that noting the manner in which a hierarchy is established is essential for understanding its effects on cooperation.
dc.description.sponsorship A.A. gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Swiss National Science Foundation under Grants No. P2LAP1-161864 and P300P1-171537. This work was also supported by the EU through FET-Proactive Project DOLFINS (contract no. 640772, A.S.) and FET-Open Project IBSEN (contract no. 662725, A.S.), and by the Ministerio de Econom a y Competitividad of Spain (grant no. FIS2015-64349-P, A.S.) (MINECO/FEDER, UE).
dc.format.extent 29
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Nature Publishing Group
dc.rights © 2018 The Author(s).
dc.rights Atribución 3.0 España
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
dc.title Collaborative hierarchy maintains cooperation in asymmetric games
dc.type article
dc.subject.eciencia Matemáticas
dc.identifier.doi https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-018-23681-z
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/640772
dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/662725
dc.relation.projectID Gobierno de España. FIS2015-64349-P
dc.type.version publishedVersion
dc.identifier.publicationtitle Scientific Reports
dc.identifier.publicationvolume 8
dc.identifier.uxxi AR/0000021235
dc.contributor.funder European Commission
dc.contributor.funder Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (España)
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