On the generic strategic stability of nash equilibria if voting is costly

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dc.contributor.author De Sinopoli, Francesco
dc.contributor.author Iannantuoni, Giovanna
dc.date.accessioned 2006-11-09T11:16:50Z
dc.date.available 2006-11-09T11:16:50Z
dc.date.issued 2002-11
dc.identifier.issn 2340-5031
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/280
dc.description.abstract We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all the equilibria are regular, hence stable sets as singletons.
dc.format.extent 328423 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries UC3M Working Paper. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2002-20
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title On the generic strategic stability of nash equilibria if voting is costly
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.identifier.repec we025620
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