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On the generic strategic stability of nash equilibria if voting is costly
Author(s):
De Sinopoli, Francesco; Iannantuoni, Giovanna
Issued date:
2002-11
ISSN:
2340-5031
Serie/No.:
UC3M Working Paper. Economics
2002-20
2002-20
Rights:
Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
Abstract:
We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all the equilibria are regular, hence stable sets as singletons.
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On the generic strategic stability of nash equilibria if voting is costly
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DE - Working Papers. Economics. WE [794]
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Economists Online [3210]
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