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On the generic strategic stability of nash equilibria if voting is costly
Autor(es):
De Sinopoli, Francesco; Iannantuoni, Giovanna
Fecha de edición:
2002-11
ISSN:
2340-5031
Serie/Num.:
UC3M Working Paper. Economics
2002-20
2002-20
Derechos:
Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
Resumen:
We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all the equilibria are regular, hence stable sets as singletons.
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