The effect of short-selling of the aggregation of information in an experimental asset market

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dc.contributor.author Veiga, Helena
dc.contributor.author Vorsatz, Marc
dc.contributor.editor Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Estadística
dc.date.accessioned 2008-07-15T12:39:22Z
dc.date.available 2008-07-15T12:39:22Z
dc.date.issued 2008-07
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/2745
dc.description.abstract We show by means of a laboratory experiment that the relaxation of short--selling constraints causes the price of both an overvalued and an undervalued asset to decrease. Hence, the aggregation of information by the market price becomes better in case the asset is overvalued but worse if the asset is undervalued. With respect to payoffs, we find that not only uninformed but also some of the imperfectly informed traders suffer from the weakening of short--selling constraints.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Statistics and Econometrics Series
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2008-38
dc.subject.other Asset market
dc.subject.other Rational expectations
dc.subject.other Experiment
dc.subject.other Short Sales
dc.title The effect of short-selling of the aggregation of information in an experimental asset market
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.eciencia Estadística
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.identifier.repec ws083808
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