Inefficient rushes in auctions

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Inefficient rushes in auctions

Author(s): Hernando, Ángel; Michelucci, Fabio
Publisher: Wiley
Issued date: 2018-01
Citation: Hernando-Veciana, A., Michelucci, F. (2018). Inefficient rushes in auctions. Theoretical Economics, 13, pp. 273–306.
ISSN: 1555-7561
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3982/TE2513
Sponsor: Ángel Hernando-Veciana thanks the support from the Ministerio Economía y Competitividad (Spain), Grants ECO2012-38863 and ECO2015-68406-P (MINECO/FEDER), MDM 2014-0431, and Comunidad de Madrid, MadEco-CM (S2015/HUM-3444). Fabio Michelucci thanks the research support of Boston Consulting Group, Prague, and financial support for his stay at the University of Queensland, where he worked on the revision of this paper, from the People Programme (Marie Curie Actions) of the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme FP7/2007-2013/ under REA Grant 609642.
Project: info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/FP7/609642
Gobierno de España. ECO2012-38863
Gobierno de España. ECO2015-68406-P
Comunidad de Madrid. S2015/HUM-3444/MODELICO
Keywords: Privatization , Efficiency , Auctions , Mechanism design , Multi-round mechanisms
JEL Classification: D44 , D82
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/27150
Rights: © 2018 The Authors
Reconocimiento 3.0 España
© 2018 The Authors

Abstract:

We analyze a setting common in privatizations, public tenders, and takeovers in which the ex post efficient allocation, i.e., the first best, is not implementable. Our first main result is that the open ascending auction is not second best because it is prone [+]

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