Information in Tullock contest

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Mostrar el registro sencillo del ítem Aiche, A. Einy ., Ezra Haimanko, Ori Moreno Ruiz, Diego Selay, A. Shitovitz, Benyamin 2017-11-13T18:29:39Z 2017-11-13T18:29:39Z 2017-11-01
dc.identifier.issn 2340-5031
dc.description.abstract We study the effect of changes of players' information on the equilibrium efforts and payoffs of Tullock contests in which the common value of the prize is uncertain. When the diseconomies of scale in exerting effort increase at a large (small) rate, in contests with symmetric information expected effort decreases (increases) as players become better informed, while in two-player contests with asymmetric information a player with information advantage exerts less (more) effort, in expectation, than his opponent. In classic Tullock contests with symmetric information the equilibrium expected effort and pay off are invariant to the information available to the players. And when information is asymmetric, a player's information advantage is rewarded. Moreover, in two-player contests, while both players exert the same expected effort regardless of their information, expected effort is smaller when one player has information advantage than when both players have the same information.Interestingly, the player with information advantage wins the prize less frequently than his opponent.
dc.description.sponsorship Acknowledgment of financial support: Israel Science Foundation, grant 648/2 (Einy); Ministerio Economía (Spain), grants ECO2014-55953-P and MDM2014-0431, and Comunidad de Madrid, grant S2015/HUM-3444 (Moreno).
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
dc.relation.ispartofseries 17-16
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.subject.other Information advantage
dc.subject.other Asymmetric information
dc.subject.other Common-value
dc.subject.other Tullock contests
dc.title Information in Tullock contest
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.jel C72
dc.subject.jel D44
dc.subject.jel D82
dc.relation.projectID Gobierno de España. ECO2014-55953-P
dc.relation.projectID Gobierno de España. MDM2014-0431
dc.relation.projectID Comunidad de Madrid. S2015/HUM-3444
dc.identifier.uxxi DT/0000001592
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