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Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
Abstract:
This dissertation consists of five independent essays:
Reliability and Responsibility: A Theory of Endogenous Commitment.
A common assumption in Political Science is that candidates are committed
to their policy announcement. In the first chapter I present This dissertation consists of five independent essays:
Reliability and Responsibility: A Theory of Endogenous Commitment.
A common assumption in Political Science is that candidates are committed
to their policy announcement. In the first chapter I present a model of
political competition where candidates announce policies that might not correspond
to the policies that are actually implemented. I analyze the possibility of
transmitting information to voters through costless electoral campaign. I stem
on Down’s intuition that meaningful electoral campaigns must be based on candidates’
reliability and responsibility. Through the analysis of an incomplete
information model of finitely repeated elections I show that electoral promises
are able to transmit reliable information to voters. Electoral campaign provides
an instrument to discipline politicians linking re-election perspectives to
the fulfillment of electoral promises and contributes to solve the informational
asymmetries between candidate and voters. An unavoidable proportion of ambiguous
politicians emerge. These results are robust to the consideration of
equilibrium refinements.
Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets and Preferences:
A Renegotiation Approach. The second chapter (fruit of a joint
work with Luis Corchón) provides a framework of analysis for situations in
which the feasible set is unknown to the planner. The concept of reversion
function is used, which describes the process that society uses to deal with unfeasibilities
(punishment, renegotiation, legal system). This reduces the problem
of implementation with unknown feasible to the case in which preferences are
unknown. We characterize the maximal set of Social Choice Correspondences
that can be implemented in a class of renegotiation functions that do not reward
agents for infeasibilities. Applications to Exchange Economies, Bargaining
and Bankruptcy are presented. The impossibility to take into account in the
renegotiation process of individual messages imposes strong restrictions to implementation.
The results are compared to the findings of literature on “feasible
implementation”.
Ramón y Canal: Mediation and Meritocracy. The third chapter (fruit
of a joint work with Antonio Romero-Medina) analyzes the centralized matching
mechanism associated to the Ramon y Canal Program. This Program is used
in Spain to promote the hiring of top researchers in Spanish R&D centers and
academic institutions. We model the process as a bilateral matching market
to study if the mechanism provides the incentives to hire good researchers.
We analyze the model both under complete and incomplete information. The comparison of the theoretical findings with the available data of the program
indicates that the model provides poor incentives to the agents involved and does not prevent from collusion between research centers and candidates. While
the objective is to reward the best researchers the mechanism only guarantees
"almost stable solutions.
The Condorcet Winner: Incomplete Information, Implementation
and Multiplicity. The fourth chapter studies the implementation of the Condorcet
Winner under incomplete information. It is shown that a trade-off between
the robustness of the Condorcet Winner and equilibrium multiplicity appears.
For a non negligible set of probability distributions exact implementation
of Condorcet consistent social choice functions cannot be obtained. The result
is proven in single peaked environments and extended to more general setups.
A positive result is provided for uniform priors.
Coordination in Sequential Admission Mechanisms. The fifth chapter
considers a family of admission (or hiring) mechanisms in which participant
are allowed to send multiple applications, as it happens in many real life situations.
This is done by extending the model presented by Alcalde and Romero-
Medina (2000). The possibility of applying to different colleges imposes serious coordination problems to colleges themselves. Unstable equilibrium allocations
may arise. Stability can be recovered only imposing application fees.[+][-]