Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences

Ginzburg, Boris

Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences

Author(s): Ginzburg, Boris

Publisher: Elsevier

Issued date: 2017-05-01

Citation: Ginzburg, B. (2017). Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences. Economics Letters, v. 154, pp. 120-123.

ISSN: 0165-1765

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.033

Sponsor: Support from Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Spain) grant MDM 2014-0431, and Comunidad de Madrid grant MadEco-CM S2015/HUM-3444 is gratefully acknowledged.

Project: Gobierno de España. MDM 2014-0431
Comunidad de Madrid. S2015/HUM-3444/MADECO-CM

Keywords: Voting , Information , Conflicting preferences , Fractionalisation , Condorcet jury theorem , Information aggregation

JEL Classification: C72 , D72 , D82

URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/25171

Rights: © Elsevier
Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España

Abstract:

Much of the theoretical literature on voting with private information finds that voters do not vote sincerely at the equilibrium. Yet there is little empirical support for this result. This paper shows that when the electorate is sufficiently divided, sincere [+]

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