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Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences
Autor(es):
Ginzburg, Boris
Editorial:
Elsevier
Fecha de edición:
2017-05-01
Cita:
Ginzburg, B. (2017). Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences. Economics Letters, v. 154, pp. 120-123.
ISSN:
0165-1765
Agradecimientos:
Support from Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Spain) grant MDM 2014-0431, and Comunidad de Madrid grant MadEco-CM S2015/HUM-3444 is gratefully acknowledged.
Proyecto:
Gobierno de España. MDM 2014-0431
Comunidad de Madrid. S2015/HUM-3444/MADECO-CM
Comunidad de Madrid. S2015/HUM-3444/MADECO-CM
Palabras clave:
Voting
,
Information
,
Conflicting preferences
,
Fractionalisation
,
Condorcet jury theorem
,
Information aggregation
Clasificación JEL:
C72
,
D72
,
D82
Embargo:
2019-05-01
Derechos:
© Elsevier
Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
Resumen:
Much of the theoretical literature on voting with private information finds that voters do not vote sincerely at the equilibrium. Yet there is little empirical support for this result. This paper shows that when the electorate is sufficiently divided, sincere
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