Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences

Ginzburg, Boris

Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences

Autor(es): Ginzburg, Boris

Editorial: Elsevier

Fecha de edición: 2017-05-01

Cita: Ginzburg, B. (2017). Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences. Economics Letters, v. 154, pp. 120-123.

ISSN: 0165-1765

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.033

Agradecimientos: Support from Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Spain) grant MDM 2014-0431, and Comunidad de Madrid grant MadEco-CM S2015/HUM-3444 is gratefully acknowledged.

Proyecto: Gobierno de España. MDM 2014-0431
Comunidad de Madrid. S2015/HUM-3444/MADECO-CM

Palabras clave: Voting , Information , Conflicting preferences , Fractionalisation , Condorcet jury theorem , Information aggregation

Clasificación JEL: C72 , D72 , D82

Embargo: 2019-05-01

URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/25171

Derechos: © Elsevier
Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España

Resumen:

Much of the theoretical literature on voting with private information finds that voters do not vote sincerely at the equilibrium. Yet there is little empirical support for this result. This paper shows that when the electorate is sufficiently divided, sincere [+]

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