Sponsor:
Support from Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Spain) grant MDM 2014-0431, and Comunidad de Madrid grant MadEco-CM S2015/HUM-3444 is gratefully acknowledged.
Project:
Gobierno de España. MDM 2014-0431 Comunidad de Madrid. S2015/HUM-3444/MADECO-CM
Keywords:
Voting
,
Information
,
Conflicting preferences
,
Fractionalisation
,
Condorcet jury theorem
,
Information aggregation
Much of the theoretical literature on voting with private information finds that voters do not vote sincerely at the equilibrium. Yet there is little empirical support for this result. This paper shows that when the electorate is sufficiently divided, sincere Much of the theoretical literature on voting with private information finds that voters do not vote sincerely at the equilibrium. Yet there is little empirical support for this result. This paper shows that when the electorate is sufficiently divided, sincere voting is an equilibrium strategy for an arbitrarily large proportion of voters. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.[+][-]