Publication:
Head starts in dynamic tournaments?

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URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/25163
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.10.008
UXXI: AR/0000018589
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head_denter_EL_2016_ps.pdf (802.42 KB)
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2016-12-01
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Elsevier
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Abstract
In promotion contests or other tournament-like situations, a principal may attach some value to the highest effort expended by an agent. We show that whenever agents interact over multiple periods, awarding a head start to one of them is optimal even with completely symmetric agents. Awarding a small head start increases maximum individual effort without decreasing aggregate effort. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Personnel economics, Contests; tournaments, Head start, Asymmetric contests
Bibliographic citation
Denter, P., Sisak, D. (2016). Head starts in dynamic tournaments?. Economics Letters, v. 149, pp. 94-97.
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DE - Artículos de Revistas