Head starts in dynamic tournaments?

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Head starts in dynamic tournaments?

Author(s): Denter, Philipp; Sisak, Dana
Publisher: Elsevier
Issued date: 2016-12-01
Citation: Denter, P., Sisak, D. (2016). Head starts in dynamic tournaments?. Economics Letters, v. 149, pp. 94-97.
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.10.008
Sponsor: Philipp Denter gratefully acknowledges the support from the Ministerio Economia y Competitividad (Spain) through grants ECO2014-55953-P and MDM 2014-0431.
Project: Gobierno de España. ECO2014-55953-P
Gobierno de España. MDM 2014-0431
Keywords: Personnel economics , Contests; tournaments , Head start , Asymmetric contests
JEL Classification: D72 , D82 , L12
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/25163
Rights: © Elsevier
Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
© Elsevier

Abstract:

In promotion contests or other tournament-like situations, a principal may attach some value to the highest effort expended by an agent. We show that whenever agents interact over multiple periods, awarding a head start to one of them is optimal even with comp [+]

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