Head starts in dynamic tournaments?

Denter, Philipp Georg; Sisak, Dana

Head starts in dynamic tournaments?

Autor(es): Denter, Philipp Georg; Sisak, Dana

Editorial: Elsevier

Fecha de edición: 2016-12-01

Cita: Denter, P., Sisak, D. (2016). Head starts in dynamic tournaments?. Economics Letters, v. 149, pp. 94-97.

ISSN: 0165-1765

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.10.008

Agradecimientos: Philipp Denter gratefully acknowledges the support from the Ministerio Economia y Competitividad (Spain) through grants ECO2014-55953-P and MDM 2014-0431.

Proyecto: Gobierno de España. ECO2014-55953-P
Gobierno de España. MDM 2014-0431

Palabras clave: Personnel economics , Contests; tournaments , Head start , Asymmetric contests

Clasificación JEL: D72 , D82 , L12

URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/25163

Derechos: © Elsevier
Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España

Resumen:

In promotion contests or other tournament-like situations, a principal may attach some value to the highest effort expended by an agent. We show that whenever agents interact over multiple periods, awarding a head start to one of them is optimal even with comp [+]

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