Tort Reform and the Length of Physician Office Visits

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dc.contributor.author Panthöfer, Sebastian
dc.contributor.editor Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
dc.contributor.other
dc.date.accessioned 2016-11-09T16:18:40Z
dc.date.available 2016-11-09T16:18:40Z
dc.date.issued 2016-11-07
dc.identifier.issn 2340-5031
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/23861
dc.description.abstract By holding healthcare providers accountable for medical errors, the medical malpractice system should steer physicians towards providing adequate levels of care. This paper tests whether tort reforms induce physicians to be more or less careful when treating patients, using the length of office visits as a proxy for physician efforts. Analyzing data from the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey on more than half a million physician office visits between 1993 and 2011, I find that caps on noneconomic damages, caps on punitive damages, and reforms of the joint-and-several liability rule have no impact on the time physicians spend with patients. Reforms of the collateral-source rule decrease the length office visits in some specifications and act as a substitute for managed care.
dc.description.sponsorship I would like to thank Roger Feldman and Matilde Machado for helpful comments and suggestions. I am grateful to Frances McCarty from the NCHS RDC, who provided invaluable help in using the NAMCS data. Financial support from CP and the Spanish Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (ECO2014-00450, MDM2014-0431) is also gratefully acknowledged. The findings and conclusions in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Research Data Center, the National Center for Health Statistics, or the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries UC3M working papers. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries 16-17
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.other Liability pressure
dc.subject.other Tort reform
dc.subject.other Managed care
dc.title Tort Reform and the Length of Physician Office Visits
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.jel l11
dc.subject.jel l18
dc.subject.jel k13
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.relation.projectID Gobierno de España. ECO2014-00450
dc.relation.projectID Gobierno de España. MDM2014-0431
dc.type.version draft
dc.identifier.uxxi DT/0000001488
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