Peace agreements without commitment

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dc.contributor.author Beviá, Carmen
dc.contributor.author Corchón, Luis C.
dc.contributor.editor Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
dc.date.accessioned 2008-04-01T08:56:08Z
dc.date.available 2008-04-01T08:56:08Z
dc.date.issued 2008-03
dc.identifier.issn 2340-5031
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/2354
dc.description.abstract In this paper we present a model of war between two rational and completely informed players. We show that in the absence of binding agreements war can be avoided in many cases by one player transferring money to the other player. In most cases, the "rich" country transfers part of her money to the "poor" country. Only when the military proficiency of the "rich" country is sufficiently great, it could be that the "poor" country can stop the war by transfering part of its resources to the "rich" country.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries UC3M Working papers. Economics;
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2008-08
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title Peace agreements without commitment
dc.type workingPaper
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.identifier.repec we081508
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